THE CASE FOR NATIONAL DNA IDENTIFICATION CARDS
Foes of the United States have demonstrated their ability to strike at the
heart of this country. Fear of renewed attacks and a desire for greater
national security have now prompted many to call for improvements in
the national personal identification system. In particular, the possibility
of a national identification card containing the carrier’s DNA
information is being seriously considered. However, this raises difficult
questions. Would such a card system, and the extraction of individuals’
DNA it entails, violate the 4th Amendment of the Constitution? This
article will show that such a card system could in fact be found to be
constitutional under the law of privacy as it stands today.

Introduction
National Identification Cards
Ever since September 11, 2001, the U.S. has remained on alert. More attacks are likely,
according to the White House. Vigilance is required. The apparent ease with which the hijackers
entered the country and integrated into American society prior to their strike has forced the
national security authorities to reevaluate their methods. How can terrorists in our midst be
identified, and further attacks prevented?
The current identification system, based on the social security number, driver’s license
and signature, is no longer adequate.1 The U.S. now needs a foolproof identification system to
avert the threat within its borders. One step towards this goal is illustrated by the Driver's
License Modernization Act of 2002,2 which would allow for cards with computer chips to carry
“not only fingerprint information but other data, ranging from medical data to credit-card
numbers - security and e-commerce on one piece of plastic.”3

Similar ID cards, carrying

biometric4 information and targeted exclusively at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of
the national identification process, are being considered for the near future.5
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DNA data
A card containing biometric information relating to fingerprints, while certain to be
somewhat controversial, could in all likelihood be introduced without too much public
opposition. Relinquishing your personal fingerprint information seems a small price to pay in the
fight against terrorism.
But fingerprints are only the first step. Indeed, even Alan Dershowitz, a Harvard law
professor known for his liberal opinions on a variety of issues, has recently argued that the state
should create a “near foolproof system of identification using fingerprints, or for even greater
accuracy, DNA information.”6 Most Americans would not, in his opinion, be averse to disclosing
the information required by such a scheme and seeing that information accumulated in vast
databanks, despite the loss of privacy this entails.

Scope of the scheme
DNA databanks of the sort at issue here have been around for a while. U.S. law
enforcement authorities began building DNA databases in the early 1990s.7

At first, only

individuals convicted of serious criminal sexual crimes were listed. Nowadays, however, the
scope of the databases has been broadened in many states to include data on individuals convicted
of murder, violent felonies, and in some states, misdemeanors. The trend is for a relentless
expansion of the scope of such information banks: bills have now been introduced in several
states to broaden the scope of the databases to include arrestees.8
Opponents of the card scheme proposed by Mr. Dershowitz insist that the scope of the
suggested DNA identification system should be limited.9 Some argue, for example, that the
scheme should only include individuals entering the country, or people with a criminal record.
However, an identification system applying only to a small cross-section of the population would
be of little use for national security purposes, and would inevitably lead to racial profiling and
unfair singling out of specific minorities.10 A nationwide card system therefore seems most
appropriate under the present circumstances.
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Unpredictable public perception of the scheme
Whereas the institution of a national identification scheme based on fingerprint
information seems relatively non-controversial, a DNA card system might prove a little more
problematic. First of all, the reaction of the American public to such a scheme is as yet fairly
unpredictable. Members of Congress themselves, when questioned on the issue, have remained
decidedly non-committal, perhaps choosing to sit on the fence until the public reaction to the plan
becomes clearer.11 In addition, a host of thorny legal issues are sure to arise in connection with
this identification scheme.
This iBrief will address the relevant privacy issues raised by the card system and the
DNA extraction and isolation processes it entails. The author will attempt to show that, despite
his personal misgivings with regards to such a system, the scheme championed by Mr.
Dershowitz may be found to comply with the 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

Discussion
Fourth Amendment
The constitutional privacy standard is set by the 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated;
and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.12

Would the DNA sampling required for the scheme constitute a search under the 4th
amendment ?
“The Fourth Amendment requires that searches and seizures be reasonable.”13 Obtaining
and examining evidence may constitute a search “if doing so infringes an expectation of privacy
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”14
Here, the DNA extraction and isolation process necessary for the card system would
undoubtedly constitute “obtaining and examining evidence.” As will be shown below, however,
this obtention of evidence might be found not to infringe upon any expectation of privacy that
society regards as reasonable.15
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If that is indeed the case, the procurement of DNA evidence needed for the card system
would not call into play the protections of the 4th Amendment. That is, even though the DNA
extraction procedure might constitute a search under the common meaning of the term, it would
not qualify as a “search” under the Constitution.
Here, neither the nature of the information gleaned (DNA code) nor the method of
extracting the DNA would lead to the conclusion that the public’s reasonable expectation of
privacy would be violated.
1. Nature of the information
The Supreme Court, in Katz v. U.S., held that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”16 This
has been used, for example, to prove the constitutionality of face-recognition security systems
comprising databases of individual faces. The argument runs as follows: you show your face in
public, therefore a profile of it may be stored in a database for future recognition, because an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy with regards to his facial features.17
DNA information is in some ways analogous. Our body constantly sheds cells, and in
particular, skin cells. The DNA carried by these cells can be collected and isolated without
difficulty, and the information it carries decoded.18 Police forces, for example, have long been
able to extract cells from a crime scene, by collecting hair follicles or bodily fluid deposits for
example. These can then be made to relinquish their DNA, which, after being amplified, can be
used to detect similarities with known DNA sequences, thus allowing for personal
identification.19
Our DNA information is thus to a certain extent readily available to extraction and
isolation. It is therefore arguable that the public has no reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to DNA information.

16

Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see Mark Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and
Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV.
127, 134-35 (2001).
17
See U.S. v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973)
18
DNA Fingerprinting; Can Blood Found at a Crime Scene Really Identify a Criminal?,
available at http://www.darylscience.com/DNAFingerprinting.html (explaining the methods of
DNA isolation from small cell samples).
19
See Baechtel et al., Panel Two: Criminal Law and DNA Science: Balancing Societal Interests
and Civil Liberties, AM. U. L. REV. 400, 421 (2002) (“It's almost impossible to not leave some
genetic legacy of yourself behind everyday.”)

If there is no reasonable expectation of privacy with regards to one’s DNA information,
the obtention of that information will not constitute a search. The DNA card scheme at issue here
would not therefore come under 4th Amendment scrutiny.
2. Method of information extraction
Even if the mere collection of DNA information is not found to violate the public’s
reasonable expectation of privacy, opponents of the card scheme might argue that the extraction
procedure itself would violate the reasonable privacy expectation, thus invoking the protections
of the 4th Amendment.
This argument would not be valid today. Modern DNA sampling methods no longer
violate reasonable societal expectations of privacy. Traditionally, DNA samples were obtained
using buccal swabs: the inside of the individual’s mouth was rubbed with a cotton wad, from
which the cells necessary for the DNA extraction process were isolated.20 Most courts found
such a method to constitute a search, bringing the entire procedure under 4th Amendment scrutiny.
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has held “that […] physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the
skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”21
But DNA sampling methods have evolved. Nowadays, it is more common to extract
DNA by applying a sticky patch to the skin on an individual’s forearm for a moment to acquire
epidermal cells without puncturing the skin surface.22 There is no sub-dermal physical intrusion.
The invasion of personal space required is minimal. The patch is applied and removed in a matter
of seconds. Courts would likely find that such a negligible intrusion does not violate reasonable
societal expectations of privacy. The cell extraction procedure would therefore not constitute a
search, and the provisions of the 4th Amendment would not be called into play.23

If the DNA sampling process is held to constitute a search, would it violate the Fourth
Amendment?
Even if the extraction and storage of DNA information necessary for the identification
system is held to constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, the process may still be found
to be constitutional.
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The Fourth Amendment requires that searches and seizures be reasonable. A search or
seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.24
“[H]owever, […] a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which
a search must be presumed unreasonable.”25 “[W]here a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves
special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to
balance the individual’s privacy expectations against the Government’s interests to determine
whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the
particular context” and thus whether the search is unreasonable.26
The DNA identification card scheme at issue here would require suspicionless searches if
it is to be applied to a large portion of the population.27 Therefore, in order to be reasonable, in
compliance with the provisions of the 4th Amendment, the search must first be proven to respond
to special governmental needs, beyond the purposes of law enforcement, and secondly, the
government’s interest in the search must be shown to outweigh the individuals’ privacy interests.
1. Special needs
The U.S. has a special need for the DNA identification system at issue here, and the
searches that go hand in hand with it. September 11th highlighted how vulnerable the country is
to attack, even from within. The demonstrated ability of its opponents to effortlessly infiltrate
American society before striking has prompted the Bush Administration to declare a more or less
permanent state of alert.

But the danger is not limited to foreign nationals.

Terrorist

organizations can no doubt count a number of American citizens in their ranks. John Walker
Lindh and Richard Reid are only two of the most recent examples of citizens of Western
countries choosing to fight against the interests of their homeland.
At times like these, it is therefore crucial not only for the law enforcement authorities and
the government, but also for private entities such as commercial airlines, public transport
companies, weapons retailers, and others, to be able to accurately identify all individuals. In the
24
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past, the Supreme Court has held the need to ensure the sobriety of railroad conductors28, and the
need for Customs officers to be drug-free29, to constitute special governmental needs. The present
need for foolproof identification and the increased level of national security it entails, would no
doubt qualify as one too.
Admittedly, the scheme proposed here would not completely shield the country from the
threat of terrorism.30 Foreign nationals, or people with no hint of a shady past would not be
hindered by the card system. But the DNA identification card would help in many other ways: it
would make it more difficult for the same individual to strike twice, and would make it
considerably more difficult for terrorists to assume false identities.31 The database would also
provide a potential stepping stone towards a greater goal: an international database, allowing the
identification of all foreign nationals with the help of similar databases abroad.
In the meantime, a national DNA database is the best option available. There might
never be complete protection against the threat of terrorism. But in these times of war, every
little bit of protection helps.
2. Non law-enforcement purposes
The second point to be considered, when analyzing the special needs exception to the
probable cause or warrant requirement, is whether the search is conducted for non-law
enforcement purposes. If a search’s immediate goal is to generate evidence for law enforcement
purposes, courts may not allow state authorities to dispense with the need for a warrant or
probable cause before conducting the search.32
If, however, courts find that the “special need” advanced as justification for the absence
of individualized suspicion is “one divorced from the State’s general law enforcement interest”33,
the search may still be found to be constitutional.34 “[T]he presence of a law enforcement
purpose does not [however] render the special needs doctrine inapplicable.”35 All that is required
is that law enforcement not be the primary purpose of the intrusion into the individual’s privacy.36
In the case at issue, the DNA identification scheme would not be intended primarily for
law enforcement use. It is undeniable that the card could prove useful to law enforcement
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authorities in the performance of their duties, but that is not in and of itself sufficient to render the
search unconstitutional.

Greatest use for the card would in all likelihood be found as an

identification tool in non-law enforcement settings such as ID checks at airport check-in desks,
for example, or as a replacement for the social security card.
3. Balancing test
Once it has been settled that there is a special need for the intrusion, and that the purpose
behind the intrusion goes beyond mere law enforcement, the balancing test cited in Von Raab is
to be applied. The reasonableness of the search is to be determined by a careful balancing of
governmental and private interests.37 The Court would have to take into consideration a host of
factors when applying this test.
First, the U.S. has a substantial interest in preventing the occurrence on its soil of any
further terrorist attacks. The proportions of the harm to be avoided would weigh strongly in favor
of the implementation of the card scheme.
Second, the Court should consider whether the purpose of the DNA extraction and
isolation is clear, and whether there are “protections against the dissemination of the information
to third parties.”38 If there is a clear purpose to the DNA extraction, and measures are taken to
avoid the risk of the information thus gleaned from being disseminated, the intrusion on the
individual’s privacy interests is more likely to be deemed minor. In the present case, the purpose
of the sampling is clear: to provide the country with a foolproof identification system. With
regards to protections against dissemination, a system wherein all the DNA information would
only be available to trustworthy medical personnel is easily imaginable.39 Such a system might
allow law enforcement officers only to have access to the results of identification tests, not the
actual information contained on the cards, for example.40
Third, when evaluating the individual’s privacy interests, it is crucial for the Court to
consider the extent of the physical intrusion required, and the nature of the information gleaned as
a result of the infringement on the individual’s privacy. As discussed above, it is most likely that
new methods in DNA extraction technology would limit the intrusion into any individual’s
privacy to a bare minimum. Furthermore, the information gleaned would most likely consist of
non-coding tracts of DNA, that is, sequences that are not translated into proteins.41 There would
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thus only be a very minimal invasion of the individual’s privacy, as no real information other than
that needed for identification purposes could be obtained from the test results.
Finally, the Court would have to consider how long the DNA information of each
individual was to be retained by the authorities after extraction. The longer the samples are kept,
the more likely they are to be misused by the authorities, either to reveal future health risks, or to
be disclosed to third parties such as insurers and employers.

Conclusion
Taking all these factors into consideration, the Court would then have to apply the Von
Raab balancing test. The weight to be attributed by the Court to each one of the factors discussed
above is difficult to predict at this point, because the “special need” at issue here is out of
proportion with any encountered by the Court in the past, and because the modalities of the
scheme have yet to be determined. But a holding that such a DNA card scheme complies with
the 4th Amendment is not beyond the realm of imagination. We might scoff at the possibility of
such a DNA card ever being introduced in our lifetimes, and may feel protected by the 4th
Amendment, but this is not a clear cut issue. September 11th may have touched our lives in more
ways than we know.
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